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Abstract 
This research paper addresses the effects of political processes on the economic performance in Kenya. The 
research forms a framework for understanding the policy and individual decisions that investors and leaders have 
to consider when making sound investment decisions. These have been based on the identification of concrete 
financial and economic issues from the results of comprehensive and in depth research carried out through 
secondary research, and also study of related finance and banking journals.  
Purpose: The core intent of this research was to understand how key economic variables such as the stock 
market performance, foreign direct investment, interest rates and inflation rates are affected by political 
processes.  
Methodology: The paper employed a secondary research design. The sample size of this research was estimated 
at 12 years. The data was analyzed using standard software. The variables were measured using correlation 
analysis. 
Findings:  A major finding of the research showed that election trends have a strong impact on the performance 
and stability of an economy.  
Conclusion: This study is focused on the effects of political processes on the economic performance of a country 
with a case of a Kenyan scenario. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that, there are some strong impacts 
associated with processes on the economic variables. 
Keywords: Political Business cycle, Political electioneering, Economic barometers 
 
1. Introduction 
In any democratic economy, the process of achieving and predicting the level of economic growth and 
performance is often pegged against stability of the country’s political environment. This according to Alesina et 
al., (1997) implies that voters tend to cast their votes based on the economic parameters such as inflation rates, 
interest rates, performance of the money markets as well perception on foreign investment. The objective of the 
policymaker is to maximize his probability of reelection. Voting behavior is retrospective, in that it depends on 
economic performance under the incumbent in the past (Kim and Mei, 2001).  
Economic performance in a period is measured by the behavior of inflation and unemployment. It should be 
noted that if voting were based on economic performance in the recent past and if expectations of inflation were 
backward-looking, an opportunistic incumbent who controlled monetary policy would find it optimal to induce 
an inflation-unemployment cycle corresponding to the length of his term, with a boom just before an election 
and a recession afterwards (Bernhard and Leblang, 2002). In order to win voters, an opportunistic policymaker 
will choose the policy that attracts most voters, so that the projected policies could be thought of as representing 
the preferences of the median voter. However in most cases, the voting pattern depends on past incumbent 
performance, and expectations of money growth depend only on past inflation rates (Berg et al., 2003b). 
Harms (2002) inferred that an incumbent president may tend to be manipulative and opportunistic of the 
elections and may design policies likely to influence voters’ decisions to support the government. Immediately 
preceding an election the government stimulates the economy via expansionary monetary policy (Easaw and 
Garatt, 2000). The levels of monetary expansion and economic activity are those that maximize voter satisfaction 
in an election period taken alone. In the period immediately after the election, the government reverses course. It 
engineers a recession via contractionary monetary policy to bring down inflationary expectations. The incumbent 
keeps economic activity low to keep expected inflation low until the period immediately before the next election, 
so that a given rate of economic expansion (induced by a monetary surprise) can be obtained at a relatively low 
rate of inflation (Kim and Mei, 2001). In the next election cycle, the same behavior is repeated. 
When the electorate sees that its income is increasing and unemployment is falling, they may not consider 
the possibility that these are short-term positive shocks and that the tradeoffs for these distortionary endeavors 
will inevitably increase taxes and price levels in the long run. Berlemann and Markwardt (2006) extend this 
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analysis to include forward looking expectations, explaining that voters will incorporate speculative expectations 
into their assessment of macroeconomic indicators, helping to explain why, incumbent politicians who preside 
over a strong economy are more likely to be reelected for another term. 
 It has also been found out by Brastiotis (2000) that the change in real economic activity in the year of the 
election, as measured either by the change in real per capita GNP or the change in unemployment in the election 
year, does appear to have an important effect on votes for president. Specifically, a 1% increase in the growth 
rate increases the incumbent's vote total by about 1%. Therefore this research paper seeks to find out the effect of 
a country’s politics on its economic performance, with greater attention being directed at money market 
performance, foreign direct investment, interest rates, inflation rates and effect on private and public investments 
on investors attitudes. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The economic performance of any developed and developing countries is often pegged on number parameters, 
which include but limited to: the performance of the stock markets, foreign direct investment, inflation rates and 
interest rates. These parameters are affected majorly by the political stability/instability of any country, which is 
equally affected by the electoral process in the country. Most electoral processes and outcomes in developed and 
developing countries are marred with a lot of uncertainties which affect investors’ attitudes. As regimes change 
so do the economic policies of different countries which in turn impact the investment decisions by investors. 
The main intent of this research therefore was to assess the effects of politics and electoral processes on 
performance of any economy, with a focus on Kenyan perspective. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
This research was guided by both general and specific objectives 
1.3.1 General objective 
The main intent of this paper was to investigate the effects of politics on a country’s economic performance. 
 1.3.2 Specific objectives 
The research specific objectives were 
(i) To ascertain the effects of political processes on inflation rates. 
(ii) To determine the effects of political processes on money market performance 
(iii)  To find out the effects of  political processes on foreign direct investment and funding 
(iv)  To establish the effects of political processes on interest rates  
 
2.0 Literature Review 
This section presents a brief review of the literatures on effects of political electorate on money markets 
performance, foreign direct investment (FDI), interest rates, Inflation rates and effect on private and public 
investment. 
 
2.1 Effect of Elections on inflation rates 
There are different findings which suggest that the fall in the inflation rate in the post-election environment does 
not necessarily reflect the degree of institutional development. As political budget cycle theory predicts, a lower 
level of democracy may translate into higher government spending before an election, given greater budgetary 
discretion and fewer checks on government actions and accountability under these regimes (Bernhard and 
Leblang, 2002). However, there remains no evidence supporting the notion that such spending produces 
deleterious economic outcomes following elections. Other political factors may instead be at work. The fall in 
inflation could be a reaction of an executive’s stronger reform mandate following elections, and hence his or her 
ability to pursue stabilizing macroeconomic policies (Berg et al., 2003b).  
Remer’s political capital hypothesis suggests that electoral victory may strengthen the hand of government 
authorities and serve as a catalyst for politicians to initiate reforms and implement effective policies (Remer, 
1993). Another theoretical possibility is that elections may produce an alteration of political power, where 
incumbent politicians are voted out of office due to their unsuccessful macroeconomic policies following an 
economic crisis or severe financial stability. In such a scenario, the newly elected government might possess a 
popular mandate to initiate difficult, yet stabilizing economic reforms. In contrast to PBC theory, these 
mechanisms suggest that elections might enhance rather than undermine the ability of governments to respond to 
macroeconomic challenges (Alesina, et al., 1997).  
The post-election fall in inflation may instead be a function of market perceptions, rather than a function of 
government policy. Fearing the election of a left-wing government, market participants may sell domestic assets 
to hedge against potential profligate spending policies, inflation, debt pressures and negative risk assessments by 
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sovereign rating agencies (Block, et al., 2002). Following elections, if the left-wing government signals a shift to 
orthodox, market friendly policies, inflation expectations are likely to diminish, helping financial markets 
rebound. The resulting lower rate environment could also help expand domestic credit and spur economic 
activity. 
 
2.2. Effects of political elections on interest rates 
Alesina (1987) assumes future policies of election winners are fixed and known, but it is much more likely that 
there is some degree of uncertainty surrounding them. This uncertainty may result from not knowing exactly 
what economic policies a given party prefers and the inflation that would result if they were implemented. Even 
though it may be easy to rank-order the impact of Left and Right policies, it may be difficult to know if the 
victorious party will implement the moderate or extreme version of its proposals. Uncertainty may also arise 
because the effectiveness of a government in implementing policy varies, in part due to changing logistical 
competence and in part due to idiosyncrasies of the current institutional context (such as the personalities 
controlling legislative committees). 
Policy uncertainty can have an effect on the real economy. A higher level of policy uncertainty increases the 
risk of holding assets with returns that depend on economic policies. For example, the decision to invest in a 
government bond is directly affected by the inflation rate since the real rate of return is equal to the nominal 
return minus the inflation rate. Any increase in the expected variance of inflation also increases the expected 
variance of the real return. This causes some investors to reallocate their money to other assets that have the 
same return but a lower level of total risk. As they do so, demand for the bond falls, as does its price. Thus, an 
increase in inflation risk increases interest rates, which can also have a negative impact on consumption, 
investment, and growth. 
 
2.3 Effects of General elections on Money market performance 
The stock market is a national economy barometer in that it speculates on the future of the economy. Thus 
political information easily spreads into the stock market with consequent mass media development. It generally 
responds to new political information that may affect the national economy future. Hence, whether or not 
political change influences the stock market continues to be an important analysis for scholars and market 
participators (Kim and Mei, 2001; Perotti and Oijen, 2001; Hassan et al., 2003). 
Exploring complicated relationship between stock market and political behavior using statistical methods is 
one of most exciting issues for academicians and investors. Politics and that economy are inextricably linked; 
that is, they have significant influence on each other, and cannot be separated (Bratsiotis, 2000; Cover, 2000; 
Easaw and Garratt, 2000; Harms, 2002; Chiu et al., 2005). 
Recent research has further examined market efficiency issues by examining stock market responses to 
uncertain political events. Most empirical investigations have focused on tracking financial market movements 
in relation to elections (Brüggelambert, 2004; Chiu et al., 2005). Major studies supported the presidential 
election cycle, in which a country’s stock markets make larger gains in the third and fourth year of a presidential 
term, while average returns in the second year are negative. Other studies have focused on stock market 
preference (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003). 
Further empirical studies examined various types of political information impact on stock markets 
(Pantzalis et al., 2000; Harms, 2002; Lin and Wang, 2007). While a prosperous domestic economy cannot 
guarantee victory for the ruling party, economic decline is frequently a catalyst for party change, based on the 
above. That political change strongly correlates to the stock market is one motivation behind this study. Various 
political events significantly influence stock market behavior, however, only a few academic researchers have 
explored stock market behavior responses to political changes. Therefore, the present study applied event study 
and panel data to examine how stock market behavior reacts to long- and short-term political uncertainty, such as 
political changes in developed countries. 
Stock market participants will price their expectations about political change into stock prices prior to an 
election and adjust their opinion according to the actual political decision making after the election and 
inauguration took place (Pantzalis et al., 2000). In the U.S., presidential elections are a key inflection point of 
change in the political landscape. As such, an increasing likelihood of a candidate’s victory should be reflected in 
stock prices. However, expectations about election results are not always clear-cut. Therefore, futures markets 
increase in volatility in tight elections due to uncertainty about election results and their implications (Jones 
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 2.4 Effects of politics on Foreign Direct investment and International funding 
When seeking to woo voters and create new regimes, leaders tend to develop new policies that can be adopted 
into future projects should they win an election. Such policies will also determine the perception of the donors 
and funding agencies which in most cases tend to originate from different economies, such as socialist, capitalist 
and communist background. In order to gain full access to funding from these economies, leaders will try to 
adopt certain policies which can make such donors to stop their funding. These policies also tend to affect the 
attitudes of the foreign direct investments (Nooruddin 2010). 
The flow of foreign investment and funding from different economies into countries with significant natural 
resources should not be taken as a given. Foreign investors/donors prefer that such countries also have stable and 
predictable investment environments that provide general standards of treatment and have predictable legislative 
and regulatory frameworks in which channels of negotiation are clear (Hassan et al., 2003). Absent an 
enforceable framework defining ownership, taxation, dispute settlement, and regulation, they fear expropriation, 
onerous administrative intervention, and unpredictable laws and regulations (Pantzalis et al., 2000). 
The literature regarding the performance of FDI has largely been discussed by different scholars. 
Chiu et al., (2003) noted that FDI locates in countries that can commit credibly to economic policies. The 
logic is straightforward. Because of the large fixed and difficult-to-reverse costs associated with FDI, capital 
owners know that once they invest in another country, they are at a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis the host 
country government than they were ex ante (Nooruddin 2010).  
Investors and donors know that politicians suffer from time-inconsistency problems wherein they might 
offer favorable economic policies to lure investment only to expropriate investment returns ex post when the 
investment is sunk (Jensen, 2006). Indeed, in the extreme, host country governments may nationalize the foreign 
firm altogether, although this is increasingly rare. When deciding where to locate, then, investors consider the 
likelihood of this sort of opportunistic behavior. Consequently, the literature finds that countries able to make 
credible policy commitments are far more attractive to FDI (Jensen 2003). 
 
2.5 Effects Political election on Public and Private Investment in a country 
Several empirical and theoretical studies have been carried out to establish the underlying relationships between 
investment and political uncertainty. It should be noted from (Jensen, 2003) that cycle in corporate investment 
corresponding with the timing of national elections around the world. During election years, firms reduce 
investment expenditures by an average of 4.8% relative to non-election years, controlling for growth 
opportunities and economic conditions (Nooruddin 2010).  
Elections around the world provide a natural experimental framework for studying political influences on 
corporate investment, allowing us to disentangle some of the endogeneity between economic growth and 
political uncertainty. If political uncertainty is higher when changes in national leadership are more probable, 
elections provide a recurring event that helps isolate the impact of policy uncertainty on investment from other 
confounding factors. The timing of elections is out of the control of any individual firm and indeed fixed in time 
by constitutional rules for a large population (Bloom et al., 2007). 
The intuition underlying the relationship between electoral uncertainty and investment is simple: if an 
election can potentially result in a bad outcome from a firm’s perspective, the option value of waiting to invest 
increases and the firm may rationally delay investment until some or all of the policy uncertainty is resolved. The 
relationship between uncertainty and real investment has been modeled by Bernanke (1983) and Bloom, et al., 
(2007), among others. In these models, firms become cautious and hold back on investment in the face of 
uncertainty. 
The increase in cash holdings is similar in magnitude to the election-year decline in investment, suggesting 
that the funds that would have been used as investment are temporarily held as cash until the election uncertainty 
is resolved. This has also been noted from Nordhaus’s (1975) model of political business cycles, there has been 
much debate over whether incumbents manipulate fiscal and monetary policy instruments to influence the level 
of economic activity prior to an election in order to maximize the probability of reelection. Therefore it is 
evident that the timing of the election year and post election events tends to make investors to reduce on their 
investments in a country (Boutchkova et al., 2010). 
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
This is an empirical study analyzing the economic performance before and after the general elections in Kenya. 
The period of study focused on GDP performance for the period between 1991 and 2008. This period was 
selected because during this general election competitive presidential, parliamentary and Civic elections were 
held compared to previous general elections which did not include presidential elections. The GDP index 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.3, No.12, 2012  
 
33 
performance during this period was analyzed and the performance of the GDP index during election years 
compared to none election years 
 
3.2 Data collection 
The study used secondary data from the Kenya Bureau of Statistics. The Data obtained on GDP covered the 
period between 31st January 1991 and 30th September 2008. The date of each general election held in Kenya in 
the years 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 was the event date. The event dates were 29th December 1992, 29th 
December 1997, 27th December 2002 and December 27th 2007. The study focused on GDP performance as 
measured using the developed economic barometers from the conceptual framework for the study period. A 
tabular representation has been represented in the table 3.2 below 
 
3.3. Data Analysis 
The main data variable for this study is the GDP index. The GDP index is used to measure the performance of 
the country from each economic year. An increase in GDP indicates that the country’s economic performance is 
on an upward trend. Economic performance indicators, principally the GDP index and its economic variables 
were analyzed to capture trends of performance of the economy for the study period. The percentage increase or 
decrease in the GDP index before and after elections were calculated and a comparison done from one election 
period to another. For the purpose of this research, the author conducted simple technical analysis of the 
respective variables and data captured in technical graphs. In order to measure the relationship between 
depended and independent variables, the researcher conducted a Pearson’s correlation analysis. 
 
4.0 Results of the research 
This research was conducted on two fronts, which involved technical analysis and correlation analysis. 
 
4.1Technical analysis of the research variables 
Technical analysis involved a deeper analysis across the trend, with greater attention being directed at the 
election year. However to be comprehensive enough, the researcher made a comparison of past and proceeding 
years after the election year.  
Technical analysis between election year and the stock market performance, foreign direct investment, 
interest rates and inflation rates, showed a systematic trend, where it was noted that during the election year, the 
trend lines of these variables were seen to move in a downward trend. This was shown by the numbers 2, 5, 8 
and 11, which represented the elections years of 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 respectively. It was noted that 
during the election years, few players are willing to invest at the stock market. Majority of the investors tend to 
fear, that the market may not perform positively and hence form poor attitudes towards the stability of the 
markets. Similarly other investors who are foreign based tend to withdraw their foreign direct investment, due to 
uncertainty in future economic policies of the incoming government. 
It was also noted that interest rates tend to rise just before the election year and decrease after the elections 
have been casted and a new government ushered into power. Investors tend to refrain from purchasing 
government bonds, since they are speculate that the economy may not be stable, and this may contribute to 
inflation, that the reduces the real interest rates in the country. A summary of the information above has been 
presented in the graphs, 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively of the appendices section. 
 
4.2 Pearson Correlations between Political elections and Economic variables 
After a Pearson correlation was carried out on the Political elections and Economic variables, it was noted that 
these economic variables are affected by political situation. The relationships between Political elections and 
Stock market performance showed a positive correlation of.318 and a significant level of .240. There was also a 
positive correlation between political elections and Foreign Direct investment with a correlation of .341 and 
significant level of .0203. A correlation analysis of political elections and interest rates was 0.296 with a 
significance level of 0.20.  A comparison between political elections and inflation rates showed a weak 
correlation of .027 and significant level of .010.  As shown in the table below, it is clear that electioneering 
period plays a significant effect on the economic performance of a country. The summary of the findings has 
been presented in table 4.0 below. 
 
4.3 Pearson Correlations between Political elections and stock market performance 
The Pearson correlation showed 0.235 relationships and the significant level was 0.320. The relationship shows 
that there is a significant positive correlation between Political elections and stock market performance. The two 
variables mobile Political elections and stock market performance shows that in every election trend, investors 
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are likely to be influenced by an election trend. The results has been shown in the table below 4.1 
 
4.4 Pearson Correlations between political elections and foreign direct investment 
The Pearson correlation showed 0.351 relationships and the significant level was 0.007. The relationship shows 
that there is a significant positive correlation between political elections and foreign direct investment. Foreign 
investors tend to be driven by election trend in a country. If they perceive that future policies are likely to be 
unfavorable, they will pull out their investment, implying that a country’ elections have an impact on foreign 
direct investment. The results has been shown in the table 4.2 below  
 
4.5 Pearson Correlations between Political elections and Interest rates  
The Pearson correlation showed 0.293 relationships and the significant level was 0.129. The relationship shows 
that there is a significant positive relationship between a country’s elections and real interest rates. Increases in 
the inflation rates on bonds tend to push interest rates up. The demand for government bonds tend to decrease as 
election periods sets in. similarly, investors tend to prefer investing in external countries which they perceive to 
be economically stable. The results has been shown in the table 4.3 below   
 
4.6 Pearson Correlations between Political elections and Inflation rates 
The Pearson correlation showed 0.102 relationships and the significant level was 0.000. The relationship shows 
that there is a significant positive weak correlation between political elections adoptions and inflation rates. The 
political elections adoptions and inflation rates shows that with the inception of electioneering period, there is 
increased inflow (circulation of money) of physical funds, which tends to increase in facilitating prices of 
commodities due to increased demand. The results has been shown in the table 4.4 below  
 
5.0 Discussions and implication of the research 
Current literature has highlighted the effects of political elections on the economic performance of a country, 
with case of Kenyan scenario. As argued by Bratsiotis (2000), voters tend to cast their votes based on the 
economic parameters such as inflation rates, interest rates, performance of the money markets as well perception 
on foreign investment. The objective of the policymaker is to maximize his probability of reelection. Voting 
behavior is retrospective, in that it depends on economic performance under the incumbent in the past. From the 
analysis, it was noted that investors tend to include forward looking expectations, implying that voters will 
incorporate speculative expectations into their assessment of macroeconomic indicators. 
However it should be noted that the fall in the inflation rate in the post-election environment does not 
necessarily reflect the degree of institutional development from the election trends. As political budget cycle 
theory predicts, a lower level of democracy may translate into higher government spending before an election, 
given greater budgetary discretion and fewer checks on government actions and accountability under these 
regimes (Bernhard and Leblang, 2002). However, there remains no evidence supporting the notion that such 
spending produces deleterious economic outcomes following elections. This has been confirmed by the weak 
correlation analysis in our research. 
From the analysis and the research findings, it was noted that interest rates tend be affected heavily by the 
presence of election trends. A higher level of policy uncertainty increases the risk of holding assets with returns 
that depend on economic policies. For example, the decision to invest in a government bond is directly affected 
by the inflation rate since the real rate of return is equal to the nominal return minus the inflation rate. Any 
increase in the expected variance of inflation also increases the expected variance of the real return. This causes 
some investors to reallocate their money to other assets that have the same return but a lower level of total risk. 
As they do so, demand for the bond falls, as does its price. Thus, an increase in inflation risk increases interest 
rates, which can also have a negative impact on consumption, investment, and growth. Political change strongly 
correlates to the stock market performance as noted from the research findings. Stock market participants will 
price their expectations about political change into stock prices prior to an election and adjust their opinion 
according to the actual political decision making after the election and inauguration took place (Pantzalis et al., 
2000).  Thus in summary, the research has established some important implications, which investors and other 
players should consider when seeking to analyze and invest in an economy. 
 
5.1 Research Limitations 
This research was carried out following a Kenyan perspective and only applicable to its culture and way of life 
of her citizens. Therefore a major limitation is that it may not be applicable to other countries due to cultural 
differences and background.  
 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.3, No.12, 2012  
 
35 
5.2 Future work 
This research was carried out based on the economic performance in Kenya while focusing on the electioneering 
trend. Future work may be carried out to investigate the social and financial effects of political trends on the 
stability of a country.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This study is focused on the effects of political elections on the economic performance of a country with a case 
of a Kenyan scenario. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that, there are some strong impacts associated with 
elections on the economic variables. Even if these economic variables are in multiple levels to develop and 
maintain economic stability, it is imperative to study with more depth of these variables in order to better 
understand how they are affected by political process and such findings can help both planners and investors in 
their decision making. 
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Fig 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Author (2012) 
Table3.2: Research sample 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2003 2006 2007 2008
value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  
Source: Author (2012) 
Table 4.0: Pearson Correlations between Political elections and Economic variables 









0.318 0.341 0.296 .027 
Sig (2-tailed) .240 0.203 .220 .010 
N 12 12 12 12 
Source: Research Data, 2012 
Table 4.1: Pearson Correlations Political elections and stock market performance 
  Stock market performance 
Political elections Pearson Correlation .235 
Sig (2-tailed) .320 
N 12 
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Table 4.2: Pearson Correlations between political elections and foreign direct investment 
  Foreign direct investment 
Political elections Pearson Correlation .351 
Sig (2-tailed) .007 
N 12 
Source: Research Data, 2012 
 
Table 4.3: Pearson Correlations between Political elections and Interest rates 
  Interest rates 
Political elections Pearson Correlation .293 
Sig (2-tailed) .129 
N 12 
Source: Research Data, 2012 
 
Table 4.4: Pearson Correlations between Political elections and Inflation rates 
  Inflation rates 
Political elections Pearson Correlation .102 
Sig (2-tailed) .000 
N 12 
Source: Research Data, 2012 
Graph 1: Technical representation of stock performance and 
 
Graph 2: Technical representation of foreign direct investment and electioneering 
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Graph 3: Technical representation of inflation rates and electioneering 
 
Graph 4: Technical representation of interest rates and electioneering 
 
 
